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RESUMEN 
Como los gobiernos, al diseñar sus políticas macroeconómicas suelen perseguir 
distintos objetivos que entran en conflicto entre sí, el diseño de las políticas se puede 
entender como un problema de decisión multicriteria. Siguiendo la propuesta 
metodológica de André y Cardenete (2005), en este artículo se usa la programación 
multiobjetivo en combinación con un modelo de equilibrio general computable para 
obtener un conjunto de las llamadas políticas eficientes en una aplicación a una 
economía regional (concretamente, la de Andalucía). Se ilustra la solución de dos 
problemas bicriterio (desempleo frente a inflación y crecimiento frente a desempleo) a 
partir de los cuales se obtiene una nueva lectura de dos resultados clásicos: la curva de 
Phillips y la ley de Okun. Finalmente, se amplía el alcance de la propuesta presentando 
un problema de diseño de política con cinco objetivos y se discuten las políticas 
eficientes que se obtienen en este contexto. 
 
Palabras clave: Políticas públicas, Teoría de la Decisión Multicriterio. Modelo de 
Equilibrio General Computable, Política Eficiente. 
 
ABSTRACT 
Since policy makers usually pursue several conflicting objectives, policy making can be 
understood as a multicriteria decision problem. Following the methodological proposal 
in André and Cardenete (2005), we use multiobjective programming in connection with 
a computable general equilibrium model to represent optimal policy making and to get 
so-called efficient policies in an application to a regional economy (Andalusia, Spain). 
We illustrate the solution of two bicriteria problems (unemployment vs. inflation and 
growth vs. unemployment) from which we get a new reading of two classical results: the 
Phillips curve and the Okun law. Finally, we enlarge the scope of the exercise by solving 
a problem with five objectives and discuss the efficient solutions that can be obtained in 
this context. 
 
Keywords: Public Policy, Multicriteria Decision Making, Computable General 
Equilibrium Model, Efficient Policy.. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
  The  design  of  public  policies  is  an  important  issue  in  economics  presenting 
important theoretical and applied challenges. The traditional way to model the design of 
an optimal economic policy involves assuming that a social planner aims at minimising 
some  social  loss  function  or  maximising  some  social  welfare  function,  typically 
identified with the utility function of a representative consumer. This approach provides 
a theoretically elegant tool that links the original economic problem to the operational 
field of optimisation theory
4. Nevertheless, this classical approach also presents some 
important shortcomings concerning its realism and implement ability in practice. 
To apply the classical approach, it is crucially needed a suitable utility or welfare 
function which represents the preferences of society. An intuitive reasoning tells that 
such a function can be very hard to find, and the intuition is reinforced by the Social 
Choice line of research pioneered by Arrow (1963), showing that in standard contexts, it 
is virtually not possible to combine the preferences of all the members of the society in 
a single social preference relationship, with reasonable properties. On the other hand, 
direct observation of the usual practice in policy making does not seem consistent with 
the  optimisation  of  a  single  specific  function.  Rather,  policy  makers  appear  to  be 
concerned  about  a  bundle  of  macroeconomic  indicators  such  as  the  growth  rate, 
inflation rate, unemployment rate, public deficit, public debt or foreign deficit, and they 
aim at improving the performance of the economy as measured by these indicators. In 
other words, the government typically faces a decision problem with several goals or 
objectives and, moreover, these goals usually conflict with each other. For example, an 
active  anti-unemployment  policy  could  foster  inflation;  increasing  economic  growth 
could be harmful for the foreign sector, and so on. 
Multicriteria Decision Making (MCDM henceforth) techniques are specifically 
aimed at dealing with this kind of situations in which there are multiple conflicting 
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goals. Several particular techniques, such as multiobjective programming, compromise 
programming,  goal  programming  and  others,  have  been  fruitfully  applied  to  many 
economic problems in which it is not reasonable or operational to assume the existence 
of a single goal or objective
5. André and Cardenete (2005) and André, Cardenete and 
Romero (2005) proposed to use a multicriteria approach connected to a computable 
general equilibrium (CGE hereafter). In both of these papers, the concept of efficient 
policy is introduced and applied to a bicriteria policy making problem for the Spanish 
economy, involving growth and inflation as objectives. 
  This paper has the following goals: firstly, we seek to apply the mixed MCDM-
CGE approach introduced by André and Cardenete (2005) and André, Cardenete and 
Romero (2005) to a regional economy (Andalusia, Spain). Secondly, we show how this 
approach, when applied to certain bicriteria problems, provides a new reading of some 
classical economic results, such as the Phillips curve and the Okun law. Finally, we try 
to extend the scope of the mentioned approach by addressing policy problems with 
more than two objectives. 
In Section 2, we identify the main elements required to represent policy making 
as  a  multicriteria  problem  and  we  define  the  concept  of  efficient  policies  in  this 
framework. In Section 3 we present the economic model used for the application and 
the database used to calibrate the model. In section 4 we display the results, which are 
grouped  in  three  policy  making  problems.  The  first  one  is  a  bicriteria  problem 
combining unemployment and inflation, which gives a particular version of the classical 
Phillips curve which we can label optimal Phillips curve or efficient Phillips curve. The 
second problem addresses growth and unemployment. Since the same policies aimed at 
increasing growth also help to reduce unemployment, we arrive at the conclusion that 
(contrarily to the unemployment-inflation problem) this case does not result to be a 
                                                 
5 See Ballestero and Romero (1998) for an introduction to multicriteria techniques and 
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genuine  multicriteria  problem  given  the  lack  of  conflict  between  objectives.  This 
problem  collapses  to  a  mono-criteria  one  and  there  is  a  single  efficient  policy 
combination.  Nevertheless,  by  applying  the  same  technique  used  to  obtain  efficient 
policies, we get a set of feasible growth-unemployment combinations from which an 
Okun-law-type relation can be inferred. Finally, we somewhat enlarge the scope of the 
analysis by increasing the number of policy objectives to five (including public deficit 
and compensating variation as a measure of consumers welfare). Using these objectives, 
we show that the observed policy can be improved in several directions with respect to 
the observed situation (by improving one or more objectives without worsening any of 
them). Section 5 summarizes the main findings of the paper. 
2. GENERAL SETTING: MCDM AND POLICY DESIGN 
  Assume there are m economic agents (typically, consumers and firms), indexed 
by  h=1,...,m,  which  are  assumed  to  act  rationally  in  the  sense  that  they  choose  the 
values for their decision variables (denoted as a vector zh) to maximise their objective 
function fh. Typically, consumers make consumption and saving decisions to maximise 
utility  and  firms  decide  their  factor  demand  and  goods  supply  to  maximise  profits. 
Assume also the government has a vector x of policy instruments, which may include 
taxes, public expenditure and investment, interest rates, and so on. 
The decision problem of agent h can be represented as choosing zh to 
maximise   fh (zh , z -h , x) 
subject to         zh Î Rh 
where Rh is the feasible set of agent h and his objective function fh may depend on his 
own decisions zh, the decisions (denoted as z-h) of the rest of agents, and the policy 
variables  x.  For  example,  the  profit  of  a  firm may  depend  on  its  own  strategy,  the 
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Let zh
*( z-h ,x) denote the optimal response of agent h, i.e., the values of his 
decision  variables  maximising  fh,  given  z-h,  and  x.  The  interaction  among  agents 
provides the equilibrium value of all the decision variables for all the agents, denoted as 
( ) ( ( ) ( )) º
e e e
1 m z x   z x , ... z x  in such a way that 
(1)       
e
h z (x) Î zh
*(z-h, x),   h=1,...,m.         
  Aggregating z
e, we get the value of the relevant macroeconomic variables in 
equilibrium  which  are  the  typical  policy  objectives  (for  example,  Gross  Domestic 
Product results from the aggregation of outputs from all the firms, the Consumer Price 
Index results from the weighted average of the prices of goods and services, and so on). 
Assume the government is interested on K macroeconomic aggregates denoted as Z1, …, 
ZK, which can be obtained from z
* according to some aggregation rules: 
          Z1ºZ1(z*(x))  
(2)            ...                 
          ZKºZK (z*(x)) 
  If a policy maker knows the response functions of all the agents, using (1) he can 
predict the equilibrium of the economy and, using the aggregation in (2), he can get the 
values of the policy objectives as a function of x. If there were a single policy objective 
(K=1),  the  optimal  design  of  the  economic  policy  would  result  from  optimizing  Z 
subject to (1) and (2). In practice, there are typically several policy objectives presenting 
some trade-off between them, so that the policy makers actually face a multicriteria 
problem. Following André and Cardenete (2005) we use multiobjective programming, 
which is a multicriteria technique aimed at determining the set of efficient solutions. In 
our context, the multiobjective design of policies can be represented by the following 
problem: 
(3)        Eff  Zº[Z1,…,ZK]  
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where Eff means the search for efficient policies and X represents the feasible set for the 
policy instruments. A feasible policy (i.e., a value of xÎX) is said to be efficient if it 
provides some values of the objective variables such that there is no feasible policy that 
can achieve the same of better performance for all the policy objectives being strictly 
better for at least one policy objective. To make this approach operation we also need 
some  description  of  the  economy  under  study,  i.e.  some  specific  contents  for  the 
decision variables zh, the objective functions fh and the interactions among economic 
agents. That part of the study is developed in the next section. 
 
3. MODEL, DATA AND POLICY VARIABLES 
The Economic Model  
We  present  a  CGE  model  following  the  basic  principles  of  the  walrasian 
equilibrium  -as  in  Scarf  and  Shoven  (1984),  Ballard  et  al,  (1985)  or  Shoven  and 
Whalley  (1992)-.  Following  the  CGE  tradition,  this  model  performs  a  structural 
disaggregate representation of the activity sectors in the economy and the equilibrium of 
markets, according to basic microeconomic principles. Taxes and the activity of the 
public sector are taken as exogenous by consumers and firms, while they are considered 
as  decision  variables  by  the  government.  Assuming  that  consumers  maximise  their 
utility  and  firms  maximise  their  profits  (net  of  taxes),  then  the  CGE  provides  an 
equilibrium solution; that is, a price vector for all goods and inputs, a vector of activity 
levels and a value for public income. In equilibrium, supply equals demand in all the 
markets (“markets clearance”) and public income equals the total payments from all 
economic agents.  To save some space, we only present some basic features of the 
model. A more detailed description of the model can be found in Cardenete and Sancho 
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The  model  comprises  25  productive  sectors  (in  order  to  match  the  Social 
Accounting Matrix, see Table 1 for a list of the sectors) with one representative firm in 
each sector, a single representative consumer, one public sector and one foreign sector. 
The production technology is described by a nested production function: the domestic 
output of sector j, measured in euros and denoted by Xdj, is obtained by combining, 
through a Leontief technology, outputs from the rest of sectors and the value added VAj. 
This value added is generated from primary inputs (labour, L, and capital, K), combined 
by a Cobb-Douglas technology. Overall output of sector j, Qj, is obtained from a Cobb-
Douglas  combination  of  domestic  output  and  imports  Xrowj,  according  to  the 
Armington (1969) hypothesis, in which domestic and imported products are taken as 
imperfect substitutes.      
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
There  are  25  different  goods  –corresponding  to  productive  sectors-  and  a 
representative  consumer  who  demands  present  consumption  goods  and  saves  the 
remainder of his disposable income after paying taxes. The government raises taxes to 
obtain public revenue R, as well as it gives transfers to the private sector, TPS, and 
demands  goods  and  services  GDj  from  each  sector  j=1,…,25.  PD  denotes  the  final 
balance (surplus or deficit) of the public budget:  





- -  
cpi being the Consumer Price Index and pj a production price index before Value Added 
Tax (VAT hereafter) referring to all goods produced by sector j. The Consumer Price 
Index is calculated as a weighted average of the prices of all sectors, according to the 
participation of each one in the overall consumption of the economy. 
Consumer disposable income (YD henceforth) equals labour and capital income, 
plus transfers, minus direct taxes: 
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- DT (w L - WC w L) - WC w L 
where w and r denote input (labour and capital) prices and L and K input quantities sold 
by the consumer, TROW represents transfers received by the consumer from the rest of 
the world, DT is the tax rate of the Income Tax (IT hereafter) and WC the tax rate 
corresponding to the payment of the employees to Social Security (ESS hereafter). The 
consumer’s  objective  is  to  maximise  his  utility  (welfare),  subject  to  his  budget 
constraint. Welfare is obtained from consumption goods CDj (j = 1,…,25) and savings 
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pinv being an investment price index. 
Regarding investment and saving, this is a saving driven model. The closure rule 
is defined in such a way that investment is exogenous, savings are determined from the 
consumer’s decision and both variables are related with the public and foreign sectors 






inv inv j ROWD PD p SD p INV    
Labour  and  capital  demands  are  computed  under  the  assumption  that  firms 
minimise the cost of producing value added. In the capital market we consider that 
supply is perfectly inelastic. For labour supply, we use the following approach, which 
shows a feedback between the real wage and the unemployment rate, related to the 












































         
where u and  u are the unemployment rates in the simulation and in the benchmark 
equilibrium respectively, w/cpi is the real wage and b is a flexibility parameter. This 
formulation is consistent with an institutional setting where the employers decide the 
amount  of  labour  demanded  and  workers  decide  real  wage  taking  into  account  the 
unemployment rate. For the empirical exercises, we take an estimated value for Spain 
from the econometric literature: b =1.25 Andrés et al. (1990). 
Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP hereafter) is calculated from the expenditure 
point of view, by aggregating the values of private consumption, investment, public 
expenditure and net exports using constant prices. 
 
Databases and Calibration 
The main data used in this paper are those contained in the Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM hereafter) of Andalusia 1995 (see Cardenete and Sancho, 2003a, for the 
technical  details  about  the  construction  of  this  matrix),  which  is  the  more  recent 
available  one.  The  SAM  comprises  40  accounts,  including  25  productive  sectors  as 
shown  in  Table  1,  two  inputs  (labour  and  capital),  a  saving/investment  account,  a 
government account, direct taxes (IT and ESS) and indirect taxes (VAT, payroll tax, 
output tax and tariffs), a foreign sector and a representative consumer.  
The numerical values for the parameters in the model are obtained by the usual 
procedure of calibration (see, for example, Mansur and Whalley, 1984). Specifically, 
the following parameters are calibrated: all the technical coefficients of the production 
functions, all the tax rates and the coefficients of the utility function. The calibration 
criterion is that of reproducing the 1995 SAM as an initial equilibrium for the economy, 
which is used as a benchmark for all the simulations. In such an equilibrium, all the 
prices and the activity levels are set equal to one, so that, after the simulation, it is 
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finding the economic equilibrium corresponding to the policy combinations obtained 
from the optimisation exercises, the interest rate is taken as numeraire and the rest of 





  We focus on fiscal policy. The vector of policy variables (x) includes the public 
expenditure in goods and services of each activity sector (gj, i=1,…,25) and the average 
tax rates applied to every  economic sector, including indirect taxes: Social Security 
contributions paid by employers (ECj) and Value Added Tax (VATj), as well as direct 
taxes:  Social  Security  contributions  paid  by  employees  (Wj)  and  Income  Tax  (TD). 
Concerning  the  feasible  set  for  these  policy  variables  we  impose  the  following 
constraints to increase the realism of the exercise: 
a) We take as a benchmark the values of public expenditure and tax rates observed 
in the SAM and obtained in the calibration procedure. We restrict all the policy 
variables to vary less than five percent with respect to their values in the benchmark 
situation (denoted as x0), that is the following constraints are imposed to the model:  
0.95 x0£ x £1.05 x0 
b) Furthermore, to avoid obtaining policies that could affect drastically the public 
budget, we impose the condition that both the overall tax revenue and the overall 
public  expenditure  in  goods  and  services  must  be  equal  to  their  values  in  the 
benchmark situation, although the composition by sectors may change
6. 
                                                 
6 For the tax revenue, we impose that the condition that it must be constant in current 
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4. RESULTS: SOLVING MULTICRITERIA POLICY MAKING PROBLEMS
7 
  For the policy making problem to be fully described, we need to select the policy 
objectives.  In  this  next  section  we  address  several  specific  problems  by  selecting 
different sets of policy objectives. We analyze two problems with two objectives and 
one problem with five objectives. 
Bicriteria Problem 1: Unemployment vs. Inflation 
Assume, first, that the policy maker only cares about two economic indicators: 
the unemployment rate (u) and the inflation rate, as measured by the annual rate of 
change of the cpi: 






   
where the subscript denotes the year. The value of cpi for 1994 is exogenously given
8 
and the value for 1995 is endogenously determined, as an equilibrium result, in the 
optimisation exercise. 
The equilibrium of the model gives, as a result, the unemployment rate u and the 
inflation rate p as (implicit) functions of the policy variables x, that is, we have u = u(x) 
and p=p(x). Once we have identified the policy objectives, the (multicriteria) policy 
making problem is fully described. The first step to address this problem is to asses the 
degree  of  conflict  between  the  policy  objectives  by  computing  the  so-called  payoff 
matrix.  This  is  done  by  solving  two  mono-criteria  problems  which  consists  of 
                                                                                                                                               
impose that it must be constant in real terms, since the public sectors is usually obliged 
to make some expenditures independently of their monetary costs. 
7 All the calculations are made using GAMS software, with solve CONOP. 
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optimising  each  objective  separately  disregarding  the  other  one:  firstly,  we  find  the 
minimum feasible value of unemployment (subject to the specified constraints on the 
policy variables and all the equations of the model). This minimum value is refereed to 
as ideal value of unemployment and denoted as u
*. By plugging the optimal values of 
the policy variables xu=arg max u in the relevant equations of the model, we obtain an 
associated value of inflation. Both of these values conform the first row of the pay-off 
(Table 2). In the same way we obtain the ideal (= minimum) value of inflation, p
* and 
an associated value of unemployment. The worst (= maximum) value of each column is 
the anti-ideal (or nadir) value for the associated objective: u* and p*, which correspond 
to the achievement of each objective, when the other one is optimised. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
  The  first  row  of  Table  2  shows  that  it  would  be  possible  to  obtain  an 
unemployment rate u
*=33.1%, together with a high inflation rate p*=3.6%. Similarly, 
(as the result of an opposite policy) the second row shows another feasible combination 
with  a  low  inflation  rate  (indeed,  a  deflation)  p
*=-0.1  %  compatible  with  a  higher 
unemployment  rate  u*=34.5%.  The  values  in  the  main  diagonal  (the  minimum 
unemployment rate and the minimum inflation rate) give the ideal point and the vector 
with the worst element of each row (in this case, the maximum unemployment rate and 
the maximum inflation rate) gives the anti-ideal or nadir point. 
From  Table  2  we  can  draw  the  following  conclusions:  first,  there  is  a  clear 
conflict between both objectives, in the sense that it is not possible to get at the same 
time  the  minimum  feasible  unemployment  and  the  minimum  inflation  rate,  since 
minimizing unemployment implies accepting a higher degree of inflation and the other 
way round. This conflict is an essential element to have a genuine multicriteria (in this 
case, bicriteria) problem. The second observation is that, whereas inflation displays a 
rather wide range of variation, the unemployment in Andalusia, (at least in the period 
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macroeconomic policy, since the range of variation of u is very small. This result is 
coherent with other existing studies for Andalusia in the literature (see, for example, 
Cardenete and Sancho, 2003b). 
The second step is to determine the efficient set of policies. In this case, a policy 
combination x providing the objective values (u, p) is said to be efficient if there is not 
another feasible policy x’ providing (u' , p' ) such that, either u’ £  u and p’ < p, or u’ <  
u and p’  £ p.  We obtain (an approximation to) the efficient set using the so-called 
constraint method, which consists of optimising one of the objectives, while the other 
one is placed as a parametric constraint. In our case, we make a grid for the feasible 
values of p, from p= -0.1 to p=3.6. Let pn denote one specific value of p in the grid. For 
each one of these values we solve the problem min u subject to the constraint p£pn and 
all the equations in the model (it is arbitrary to decide which objective is parameterized 
and which is optimized in every point). 
Figure 1 shows the result of these calculations. It can be seen that, in the set of 
efficient  policies,  there  is  a  monotonic  relationship  between  unemployment  and 
inflation but the trade-off between both rates, as measured by the slope of the frontier, is 
not necessarily constant. Note that the resulting curve can be interpreted as the classical 
(short-run)  “Philips  curve”,  initially  reported  by  Phillips  (1958),  which  trade-offs 
employment against inflation and was initially interpreted as a “policy menu” in the 
sense that the government, by applying expansive or contractive policies, could choose 
among different combinations of inflation and unemployment (Samuelson and Solow 
1960). 
INSERT FIGURE 1 
Three important remarks apply to the so-obtained Phillips curve as compared 
with some traditional practices in the literature: first, it is important to note that the 
curve shown in Figure 1 is not exogenously imposed but endogenously obtained from 
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literature is to look for a Phillips curve by plotting together pair-wise observations of 
unemployment and inflation for different years and perhaps adjusting some statistical 
regression (Phillips 1958, Lipsey 1960, Samuelson and Solow 1960). Since the dots in 
these graphs corresponds to different years, some structural elements of the economy 
may change across years so that these results can not be clearly interpreted as a policy 
trade-off,  since  it  may  not  be  possible  to  move  from  one  unemployment-inflation 
combination to another one just by changing the economic policy. The Phillips-like 
curve  shown  in  Figure  1  is  obtained  under  different  policy  scenarios  for  a  given 
economy in the same period of time, so that the underlying fundamentals are constant. 
In this sense, this curve can be more properly interpreted as a pure policy trade-off. 
Finally, a subtle remark for his curve should be made when it is to be interpreted as a 
Phillips  curve:  since  the  government  can,  in  principle  implement  a  wide  variety  of 
policy  combinations,  it  is  also  possible  that  some  of  these  policies  result  in 
unemployment-inflation combinations strictly above (and to the right of) the curve in 
Figure 2, meaning that the implemented policy is not efficient. From this point of view, 
the curve obtained in Figure 2 can be labeled as “optimal Phillips curve” or “efficient 
Phillips curve” in the sense that all the points result from efficient policies. 
Bicriteria problem 2: growth vs. unemployment 
Assume now the policy makers care just about unemployment and economic 
growth, as measured by the annual rate of change of the GDP: 







×    
where  the  data  for  1994  is  exogenously  given.  When  optimising  each  objective 
separately, we get a new payoff matrix which is shown in Table 2. It can be seen that in 
this case, both mono-criteria problems have exactly the same solution, meaning that the 
same kind of policies aimed at increasing growth also help to reduce unemployment. It 
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no conflict between the objectives, we come up with the result that this is basically not a 
true  multicriteria  problem,  since  it  collapses  to  a  single  mono-criteria  one  (either 
maximising  growth  or  minimising  unemployment  will  give  the  same  solution).  The 
ideal point of the problem is given by any of the rows of Table 3: g
*=3.4, u
*=33.1.  
Since  any  movement  from  this  point  will  imply  reducing  growth  and/or  increasing 
unemployment we conclude that this is the only efficient combination.  
INSERT TABLE 3 
Nevertheless, it is interesting to use the same method applied before to construct 
efficient policies. Using this approach, we come up with a “frontier” of feasible growth-
unemployment  combinations  by  doing  the  following  steps:  First,  find  the  minimum 
value of growth (by solving the associated minimisation problem), which turns out to be 
g =2.1. Second, make a partition in the range for the feasible growth values: [2.1, 3.4]. 
Third, solve a number of problems of the type min u  subject to g ³ gn, where gn refers to 
every specific value in the partition. The result of this exercise is illustrated in Figure 2. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 
  Note that the interpretation of this figure is crucially different to the one given 
for  Figure  1.  In  this  case,  the  curve  can  not  be  interpreted  as  a  set  of  efficient 
combinations since only one of them is efficient. Rather it can be taken as an estimation 
of the relationship between growth and unemployment in the same fashion as predicted 
by the classical Okun law (Okun, 1962). By comparing the minimum and maximum 
values for growth and unemployment, we observe that growth has a feasible range equal 
to 3.4 – 2.1 = 1.3 and unemployment has a range 34.7 – 33.1 = 1.6. Dividing the second 
amount by the first one, we obtain that, on average, an additional percentage point of 
growth seems to imply a reduction of 1.2 points in unemployment. Once again, it should 
be remarked that this is a particular type of Okun law: it does not attempt to capture the 
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different feasible growth-unemployment combinations that can be obtained for a given 
economy in a given period of time across different policy combinations. 
Policies with More than Two Criteria 
In order to enlarge the scope of the discussion made so far, we consider now the 
possibility  that  the  government  is  concerned  about  a  larger  number  of  criteria.  To 
illustrate  the  way  to  deal  with  this  kind  of  settings,  we  show,  as  an  illustration,  a 
problem in which the government is concerned about five objectives: the first three of 
them are those discussed above: growth, inflation and unemployment. We also include 
as an objective minimizing Public Deficit (PD) which is an important political concern 
in practice in many countries and regions. Finally, since the policy makers are supposed 
to aim at increasing social welfare, we include as an objective (the maximization of) 
Compensating Variation (CV) which is a conventional welfare measure in monetary 
terms (see, for example, Mass-Colell et al. 1995, p. 82). We arbitrarily set as zero the 
CV  in  the  observed  situation,  in  such  a  way  that  CV  >  0  (<0)  means  that,  after 
implementing the analyzed policy combination, the consumers are better off (worse off) 
than before implementing it. Summing up, we have two “more is better” objectives 
(which  must  be  maximised):  growth  and  compensating  variation,  and  three  “less  is 
better” objectives (to be maximised): unemployment, public deficit and inflation. 
By solving five mono-criteria problems, we get the pay-off matrix for this policy 
problem, which is shown in Table 3. As in the previous exercises, the values in the main 
diagonal, which are displayed with bold characters, conform de ideal point, whereas the 
worst value for each  column (displayed underlined) conform the  anti-ideal point. A 
visual  inspection  of  the  matrix  show  that  we  have  the  following  conflicts  among 
objectives: as discussed above, growth and unemployment have a joint behaviour in the 
sense that there is no conflict between them, but both of them strongly conflict with 
inflation and public deficit. Public deficit, in turn, behaves almost exactly the same as 
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designed: public deficit is measured in nominal terms (current monetary units) so that 
its  value  can  vary,  on  the  one  hand,  because  of  real  shifts  in  public  income  or 
expenditure, and on the other hand, because of changes in prices. As documented in the 
previous section (see footnote 4), the policy exercises are constrained to give the same 
(nominal)  value  for  public  income,  whereas  public  expenditure  is  restricted  to  be 
constant in real terms. Given these constraints, the only way to reduce (nominal) public 
deficit is to reduce prices, so that the nominal value of public expenditure will decrease 
(while the nominal value of public income is fixed). Finally, the compensating variation 
seems to display a moderate degree of conflict with growth and unemployment and a 
strong degree of conflict with inflation and public deficit
9. 
We  illustrate  now  two  alternative  ways  to  obtain  efficient  policies:  the 
previously used constraint method and the weighting method. To apply the constraint 
method, we need to optimise one single objective while keeping the rest as parametric 
constraints.  The  way  to  fix  these  constraints  depends  on  the  specific  problem.  To 
illustrate the technique, we force all objectives except the one being optimized to have 
an equal or better value than that in the observed situation. The observed values (taken 
from the databases reported in section 3) are the following: 
(4)  g = 2.79  p = 4.4   u = 33.9  PD = 110800.7  CV = 0   
where PD and CV are measured in 10
6 euros. Thus, the first candidate point is obtained 
by solving the following problem: 
(5)      Max g                   
    subject to  p £ 4.4,  u £ 33.9, PD £ 110800.7, CV³0 
        all the equations of the model 
                                                 
9 Given the joint behavior of some objectives, an operational way to deal with this 
problem could be to group them so that we end up with a problem with less than five 
objectives.  Nevertheless,  for  illustrative  purposes,  we  find  useful  to  keep  all  five 




























s  18 
  The solution of problem (5) is given by 
g = 3.4   p = 3.6   u = 33.1  PD = 108605,4  CV = 2243.5 
Note that this combination Pareto-dominates the observed situation (4), since not 
only the growth rate is larger than the observed one, but also the CV is larger and 
inflation, unemployment and public deficit are lower. So, we conclude that, according 
to our setting, the observed policy displays some degree of inefficiency and it could be 
unambiguously improved with respect to the five objectives considered here. 
By doing similar calculations for each objective, we obtain five points which are 
displayed in the rows of Table 5. Note that some rows of this matrix are the same as 
those  in  Table  4.  Specifically,  the  solution  for  growth,  unemployment  and  the 
compensating variation are the same as in the respective mono-criteria problems. The 
reason is simply that the constraints imposed are not binding since the unconstrained 
optima  shown  in  Table  4  dominate  the  observed  situation  for  all  the  objectives. 
Nevertheless,  the  situation  is  different  for  inflation  and  public  deficit,  since  the 
unconstrained optimal values (those in Table 4) violate the constraints for growth and 
unemployment.  This  makes  the  constrained  optima  being  different  from  the 
unconstrained  ones.  Nevertheless,  observe  that,  in  the  optimal  solution  found,  some 
constraints are unbinding. 
A sufficient condition for the constraint method to provide efficient solutions is 
that the parametric constraints are binding. This means that we can not be sure that the 
solutions found up to now are efficient, although any of them Pareto-dominates the 
observed situation. At this point, to find solutions that are efficient for sure, we have 
two  possibilities:  the  first  one  is  using  still  the  constraint  method  and  making  the 
parametric constraints tougher, by increasing the value of the “more is better objectives” 
(growth and CV) and/or decreasing the value of the “less is better” objectives (inflation, 
unemployment and public deficit) until we find a solution when all of them are binding 
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The second approach is to use the weighting method. This method consists of 
maximizing the following sum of normalized value of objectives: 
(6)   







































w p g     
where each objective is normalized by subtracting the anti-ideal value and dividing by 
the difference between the ideal and the anti-ideal value (both of them being given in 
Table 4), so that the resulting quotient is bounded by construction between zero (when 
the objective is equal to the anti-ideal) and one (when it is equal to the ideal)
10. This 
normalization  eliminates  units  of  measurement  and  allows  the  addition  having 
mathematical  and  economic  sense.  The  coefficients  wi  are  preference  parameters 
representing how concerned the policy maker is about each objective i. We illustrate the 
policy combination obtained with wg = wp = wu = wPD = wCV =1, meaning that the policy 
maker is equally concerned about all the objectives. The maximization of (6) with this 
set of weights gives the following solution: 
g = 3.4   p = 3.5   u = 33.1  PD = 109131.1  CV = 2643.1 
which Pareto-dominates the observed situation (4) and provides an alternative efficient 
policy combination. By testing different combinations of weights we obtain different 
efficient  solutions  which  may  respond  to  different  preference  configurations  of  the 
policy maker. As an extreme case, if we fix wi=1 for a specific objective and wj=1 for 
the rest, meaning that the policy maker is concerned only about objective i, we would 
get the i-th row of the pay-off matrix 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS 
                                                 
10 Note that, for the “more is better” (“less is better”) objectives, i.e., g and CV (p, u and 
PD),  the  denominator  is  positive  (negative),  so  that  the  function  depends  positively 
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  Model policy making can be suitably represented as a multicriteria problem for a 
double  reason.  Firstly,  from  a  conceptual  perspective,  it  seems  a  sensible  way  to 
understand and represent the concerns and the procedures actually followed by policy 
makers.  Secondly,  from  an  empirical  perspective,  MCDM  techniques  can  be  of 
considerable help to get operative policy recommendations and, therefore, to decide 
how to use policy instruments in practice. 
A  CGE  model  properly  calibrated  for  the  Andalusian  economy  allows  us  to 
solve some policy making problems with different properties: Firstly, when addressing 
unemployment and inflation as policy objectives, we obtain a set of efficient policies 
that can be interpreted as a particular version of the classical Phillips curve which we 
can label optimal Phillips curve or efficient Phillips curve. Secondly, when considering 
growth and unemployment as policy objectives, we arrive at the conclusion that this 
combination  collapses  to  a  mono-criteria  one  and  there  is  a  single  efficient  policy 
combination. By applying the same technique used to obtain efficient policies, we get a 
set  of  feasible  growth-unemployment  combinations  from  which  a  particular  type  of 
Okun law can be obtained. 
Enlarging the number of objectives makes the problem computationally more 
demanding but also more interesting and realistic. By including five policy objectives 
we have shown that the observed policy could have been unambiguously improved in a 
number of ways depending on the weight given by the policymaker to each objective. 
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TABLE 1: Productive Sectors in SAM 
1. Agriculture  14. Vehicles 
2. Cattle and Forestry  15. Transport 
3. Fishing  16. Food 
4. Extractives  17. Manufacturing of Textil and Leather 
5. Refine  18.Manufacturing of Wood  
6. Electricity  19. Other Manufactures 
7. Gas  20. Construction 
8. Water  21. Commerce 
9. Minery  22.Transport y Communications 
10. Manufacturing of 
Construction Material 
23. Other Services 
11. Chemicals  24.Sales Services 
12. Manufacturing of 
Metal Products 
25.Non Sales Services  
13. Machinery   
    Source: Cardenete and Sancho (2003a). 
 
TABLE 2: Pay-off matrix unemployment vs. inflation       
  u       Unemployment (%)  p p p p Inflation (%) 
Min       u        33.1  3.6 
Min p p p p        34.5  -0.1 
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TABLE 3: Pay-off matrix growth against Unemployment       
  g  g  g  g growth (%)  u       Unemployment (%) 
Max g  g  g  g        3.4  33.1 
Min u        3.4  33.1 
Source: own elaboration. 
 
 
TABLE 4: Pay-off matrix of the problem with five objectives 






Max g  g  g  g  3.4  3.6  33.1  108605.4  2243.5 
Min p  p  p  p  2.4  -0.1  34.5  100586.1  -7642.7 
Min u  3.4  3.6  33.1  108547.7  2177.4 
Min PD  2.3  -0.1  34.5  100564.5  -7903.9 
Max CV  3.2  3.9  33.4  110723.8  3049.0 
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TABLE 5: Using the constraint method with respect to the observed situation 






Max g  g  g  g  3.4  3.6  33.1  108605.4  2243.5 
Min p  p  p  p  3.2  1.7  33.4  105427.3  0.0 
Min u  3.4  3.6  33.1  108547.7  2177.4 
Min PD  3.2  1.7  33.4  105401.9  0.0 
Max CV  3.2  3.9  33.4  110723.8  3049.0 



















































































FIGURE 2: Relationship between unemployment and growth 
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